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During 2001 and 2002, the Czech koruna experienced a strong apprecia-
tion trend against the euro in both nominal and real terms. This apprecia-
tion was regarded by both the central bank officials and other economists
as being mainly driven by market expectations of the conversion of some
one-off privatization revenues in euros into the domestic currency in the fo-
reign-exchange market. The central bank (Czech National Bank, CNB) de-
cided to intervene in the market to stop the appreciation and eventually to
reverse the trend, and it finally succeeded in bringing the exchange rate
back to a more fundamental-based level.
However, as discussed in (Ger‰l, 2004), it remains a question whether it
was the foreign-exchange intervention that caused the appreciation bubble
to burst, or whether other factors might have had more impact, such as
a change in the government’s privatization strategy, a significant decrease
in the interest-rate differential, external environment or government hav-
ing followed the Strategy (CNB, 2002), converting the euro revenues out of
the market. In other words, we are interested in whether the foreign-ex-
change intervention was in fact effective. In this article, several econome-
tric approaches to testing the effectiveness of foreign-exchange intervention
are reviewed and subsequently some of them applied to the Czech data. By
effectiveness, we mean a significant impact of interventions on exchange-
-rate movements in the desired direction.
The article is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews some relevant li-
terature on the econometrics of foreign-exchange intervention. In Section 3
the CNB’s interventions are discussed and the reaction function estimated.
Section4 estimates theeffect of FX interventions on theexchange-rate level,
while Section5 investigates theeffect on volatility. Section6 presents theef-
fect of intervention strategy on their successfulness within the event-study
approach. Section 7 concludes the paper.
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The econometrics of foreign-exchange intervention usually focus on two
issues: estimating the reaction function of the central bank, i.e. trying to
find factors that cause the central bank to intervene in the foreign-exchange
market, and testing the impact of intervention on the exchange rate (i.e. ef-
fectiveness of intervention), sometimes with reference to a particular trans-
mission channel such as the portfolio-balance channel, signaling channel,
microstructure (order-flow) channel, noise-trading channel or coordination
channel.1
Since the end of the 1970s, a number of studies has emerged that tried
to determine whether the central bank’s interventions are predictable, es-
timating the central bank’s intervention reaction function. The change of
the exchange rate, the distance of the exchange rate from a targeted level,
exchange-rate volatility, interventions of other central banks, as well as past
interventions are usually included as explanatory variables, reflecting pos-
sible motives for intervention and the first order autocorrelation that is usu-
ally found in the intervention data (Dominguez – Frankel, 1993a), (Ra-
maswamy – Samiei, 2000), (Ito, 2003).2 Given the possible simultaneity in
determination of the exchange rate and intervention, as a change in the ex-
change rate may trigger intervention and intervention in turn influences
the exchange rate, some studies apply instrumental-variables techniques.3
Edison (1993) and Almekinders (1995) survey the literature on reaction
functions until 1992. In general, most of the studies have found a signifi-
cant relationship and strong evidence for the “lean-against-the-wind” mo-
tive, i.e. to prevent the exchange rate from moving in one direction through
operations with the opposite effect, although the degree of significance and
the size of estimated coefficients differed across periods and countries, de-
pending on the data used (frequency of the data and proxies for the inter-
vention variable as most central banks do not publish official intervention
data), the way of deriving the level of the targeted exchange rate (moving
average, PPP equilibrium level) and the estimation method.
More recently, also because of more frequent data (such as daily data) on
intervention becoming available from central banks, binary choice models
such as the probit or the logit model have been used to estimate the pro-
bability of intervention rather than the precise amount (Baillie – Osterberg,
1997), (Dominguez, 1998), (Ramaswamy – Samiei, 2000), (Kim – Sheen,
2002), (Ito – Yabu, 2004), (Akinci et al., 2005). As interventions are charac-
terized by a large number of zero-value observations when using daily data,
an OLS estimation of the reaction-function coefficients would be biased
given that the dependent variable is obviously truncated (Humpage, 1999),
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1 For channels of influence, see (Ger‰l, 2004) or (Sarno – Taylor, 2001).
2 The reaction function is usually derived ad hoc, without any theoretical background. For
an example of the reaction function derived from a model based on a loss function of the cent-
ral bank, see (Almekinders, 1995, p. 63).
3 For exchange rates, lagged variables are usually used as instruments, especially when using
daily data (Dominguez – Frankel, 1993a). Humpage (1999) uses early morning quotes for the ex-
change rate on the right hand side, as this appears to reflect to a large extent the actual beha-
vior of monetary authorities.(Ito – Yabu, 2004). Thus, some studies estimate the central bank’s inter-
vention reaction function in two steps: first, the probability of intervention
through discrete choice models for the decision to intervene is estimated,
and second, the amount of intervention is estimated via the standard re-
action function. The predicted amount of intervention is then constructed
from the two estimates, using different techniques (Almekinders – Eijffin-
ger, 1996), (Humpage, 1999), (Kearns – Rigobon, 2005).
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the literature on the effectiveness of
foreign-exchange intervention concentrated on testing the relevance of
the portfolio-balance channel and signaling channel (Humpage – Osterberg,
1992), (Dominguez, 1992), (Ghosh, 1992), (Edison, 1993), (Dominguez –
Frankel, 1993a, 1993b), (Kaminsky – Lewis, 1996), (Baillie – Osterberg,
1997).4 The evidence is mixed for the portfolio-balance channel, while for
the signaling channel most studies found some significant impact of inter-
vention.
Since the mid-1990s, the focus has moved to analysis of channels based
on the microstructure and functioning of the foreign-exchange market such
as the noise-trading channel (Hung, 1997), order-flow channel (Lyons, 2001)
or coordination channel (Reitz – Taylor, 2006).5 Empirical studies based on
these channels usually use daily or even high-frequency (i.e. intraday) data,
finding support for functioning of the channels (Dominguez, 2003), (Scalia,
2004a, 2004b).
The recent literature adopts a direct approach to testing the effectiveness
of intervention, regressing changes in exchange-rate level and volatility on
the intervention variable and other variables of influence, taking into ac-
count particular econometric difficulties associated with such a direct ap-
proach. These studies do not relate the results to a particular channel of in-
fluence, although indirectly they usually refer to the market microstructure
or signaling effect of intervention. Two main approaches are usually ap-
plied: a structural approach and event-study approach (Neely, 2005).
The structural approach takes into account the simultaneous determina-
tion of the exchange rate and intervention that would lead to inconsistent
estimates of coefficients within the simple OLS estimation.6 Thus, a system
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4 The portfolio-balance channel assumes that domestic and foreign assets are imperfect substi-
tutes and investors thus diversify their holdings among both types of assets based on expected
returns and variance in returns. An intervention operation leads investors to rebalance their
portfolios and, as a result, to a change in the exchange rate. In the signaling channel, inter-
vention serves as a means to convey inside information from the central bank to markets, 
either about the “correct” fundamental level of the exchange rate, which may be assessed dif-
ferently by the central bank than by the rest of the FX market, or about future monetary po-
licy, thereby influencing exchange-rate expectations (Sarno – Taylor, 2001), (Ger‰l, 2004).
5 The noise-trading channel assumes that if the majority of FX traders are chartists (noise tra-
ders), i.e. relying on the most recent market developments, volatility-enhancing intervention
may reverse their trading strategies and stop, for example, an exchange-rate misalignment.
The order-flow model of exchange-rate determination subscribes the main driving force of the ex-
change-rate movements to the way private information is transmitted throughout the market
via order flows, i.e. signed buyer-initiated versus seller-initiated transactions. The coordination
channel assumes that central-bank intervention may act as a coordinating signal in a situation
of strong and persistent exchange-rate misalignment caused by non-fundamental factors (Ger‰l,
2004).
6 Simple OLS was used for the example by Dominguez and Frankel (1993a).of simultaneous equations is formed and estimated via the instrumental-
-variables approach. Some studies use lagged interventions as an instru-
ment for current interventions (Ramaswamy – Samiei, 2000), (Égert –
Komárek, 2005), while other studies apply the two-stage least squares ap-
proach, estimating first the reaction function with lagged exchange rate as
an instrument for the current exchange rate and subsequently using the fit-
ted values of interventions from the reaction function as an instrument for
current interventions in the exchange-rate equation (Almekinders, 1995),
(Galati et al, 2005), (Disyatat – Galati, 2005), (Kearns – Rigobon, 2005).
Within the event-study approach, a success criterion is specified that en-
ables differentiation between “successful events” of intervention and un-
successful events (Humpage, 1999). For example, successful events may be
defined as those days of intervention in which intervention sales (purcha-
ses) of foreign currency were associated either with domestic currency ap-
preciation (depreciation) on that day, or smaller depreciation (appreciation)
when compared to the previous day. All other intervention days are defined
as unsuccessful. The proportion of successful interventions reveals whether
intervention has been effective.
By concentrating only on thedays of intervention (events), theevent-study
approach allows tackling the usual difficulty with time-series econometrics
of interventions, namely the high number of periods of no intervention that
may cause the time-series approach to find no relationship between inter-
ventions and the exchange rate. However, an analysis of the effectiveness
of interventions based on the intra-event exchange-rate change (in this case
the change within a day) may be subject to the “endogeneity” problem: as
the central bank’s decision to intervene may be dependent on the exchange-
-rate development in the period of intervention, the reason to intervene
would also label the intervention successful or not, thus biasing the results
towards ineffectiveness.
The “event window”, i.e. the number of periods forming one event, varies
across studies. Fatum and Hutchison (1999), Fatum (2000), Fatum and
Hutchison (2003), Edison et al. (2003), Fratzscher (2005) and Égert and
Komárek (2005) define the event window according to the number of con-
secutive days of no intervention between days of intervention. Fatum (2000)
considers, for example, a maximum of 15 days of intervention inactivity be-
tween consecutive days of intervention, i.e. an event is identified as a se-
ries of consecutive days starting and ending with an intervention day and
with a maximum of 15 consecutive days of no intervention allowed within
the event. Moreover, as the criterion of successfulness the change in the ex-
change rate, either after the event (in the post-event window) or between
the levels prevailing before and after the event (i.e. between pre-event and
post-event windows), is used in order to eliminate the endogeneity problem.
Again, the length of pre-event and post-event windows may reach from one
to more days, but are usually symmetric and the same across the whole
analysis.
The event-study approach also allows inferring what makes intervention
successful. The events are labeled successful or unsuccessful and denoted 1
for successful and 0 for unsuccessful. Subsequently, a discrete-choice model
is applied (probit or logit). Among the explanatory variables, the amount of
intervention, a dummy for coordination among the central banks concerned,
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on theeffectiveness of intervention can be found in theliterature (Humpage,
1999), (Fatum, 2000), (Fratscher, 2005).
The impact of interventions on volatility has also attracted a lot of at-
tention in the literature on intervention. Most studies analyze the effec-
tiveness of interventions within a GARCH framework, estimating both
the effect of interventions on levels in the mean equation and on conditional
volatility in thevariance equation (Almekinders, 1995), (Almekinders – Eijf-
finger, 1996), (Baillie – Osterberg, 1997), (Dominguez, 1998), (Domac – Men-
doza, 2002), (Ito, 2003), (Nagayasu, 2004), (Guimaraes – Karacadag, 2004),
(Akinci et al., 2005), (Égert – Komárek, 2005), (Ger‰l – Holub, 2006).7 Other
studies use data on implied volatility derived from option prices (Bonser-
-Neal – Tanner, 1996), (Dominguez, 1998), (Galati et al., 2005), (Disyatat –
Galati, 2005). Most studies found a significant effect on exchange-rate
volatility, but in some studies interventions were found to enhance volati-
lity, while in others to decrease volatility.
Some authors argue that the effectiveness of intervention may by greater
in emerging markets compared with developed economies. Based on a sur-
vey among central banks, Canales-Kriljenko (2003) identifies four reasons
why central-bank intervention in emerging markets may have more of
an impact on the exchange rate: lack of full sterilization, the large amount
of intervention relative to market turnover, informational advantage of
the central bank over market participants and moral suasion. However, em-
pirical evidence on emerging markets is mixed, as most studies found
agreater effect of intervention on volatility than on the level of the exchange
rate, especially when analyzing Mexico and Turkey (Domac – Mendoza,
2002), (Guimaraes – Karacadag, 2004), (Akinci et al., 2005), (Ishii et al.,
2006).
Available studies on the interventions of the CNB also provide mixed evi-
dence as to the effectiveness of interventions. While some studies found no
or small and short-term impact on the exchange-rate level and significant
impact on increased volatility (Holub, 2004), (Disyatat – Galati, 2005),
(Ger‰l – Holub, 2006), other studies came to more positive results with re-
gard to the effect on the exchange-rate level, using either the event-study
approach (Égert – Komárek, 2005) or intra-day data on order flows (Scalia,
2004a, 2004b).
3. The Czech National Bank’s Interventions and the Reaction
Function
During 2001 and 2002, the Czech National Bank intervened in the FX
market, purchasing euros in order to reduce the value of the Czech koruna
that began to appreciate sharply against the euro in mid-2001.8
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7 Some studies extend the GARCH framework by allowing the volatility to be regime-dependent
(Markov-switching models), see (Reitz, 2002) or (Beine et al., 2003).
8 For discussion of the Czech interventions and other policy measures that accompanied the in-
terventions, see (Ger‰l, 2004), (Holub, 2004), (Scalia, 2004a, 2004b), (Égert – Komárek, 2005),
(Disyatat – Galati, 2005) and (Ger‰l – Holub, 2006).Figure 1 shows that there were actually two different periods of inter-
vention activity: in thefirst period, from October2001 to April2002, theCNB
intervened only on a few days, disclosed its intervention activity to the pub-
lic, and purchased huge amounts of euros, reaching almost 400 million eu-
ros in a single day of intervention. In the second period – from July until
September 2002 – the CNB intervened in a more discrete manner, pur-
chasing euros much more frequently, but only in small amounts.
In the first period the CNB intervened on 13 days within seven months
and the average amount of intervention was 150 million euros a day, while
in thesecond period it intervened on 28days within three months and theave-
rage amount was only 35 million euros a day.
Following Ito (2003), we estimate an intervention reaction function of
the following form, using daily data:
INTt = b0 + b1 st–1 + b2(st–1 – s
^
t–1) + b3 VOLt–1 + b4INTt–1 +  t (1)
As the CNB intervened over the period of interest only against appreci-
ated currency, i.e. purchasing euros, the intervention variable INT is de-
fined as the amount of euro purchases. We expect the central bank to in-
tervene if the change in the spot rate is large, or if the spot exchange-rate
deviates from a “target” exchange rate s
^
t–1 (that is allowed to be time-de-
pendent and was set to a 10-day backward-moving average), or if the volati-
lity of theexchange rate VOL, as measured by standard deviation of changes
in the exchange rate over the last five days, is high. Moreover, interven-
tions usually come in clusters, so that yesterday’s intervention makes to-
day’s intervention more likely, a reason to include lagged intervention.
In order to address the simultaneity bias when estimating the reaction
function, we follow thecommon practice and use only lagged values of theex-
change rate. Table 1 shows the estimation results for the reaction function
given by (1).
Table 1 indicates that the central bank systematically intervened to cor-
rect the deviation of the exchange rate from the “target” value. As the tar-
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Rget value is moving, this might be interpreted as the CNB having inter-
vened when theexchange rate appreciated too much compared with theave-
rage value of the last five days. The coefficient for the reaction on the short-
-term change in the spot exchange rate has the right sign, but is not sta-
tistically significant. The central bank’s interventions were also triggered
by higher volatility.
The results are in line with Ger‰l and Holub (2006), who estimate a simi-
lar reaction function, but do not include volatility as an explanatory vari-
able and estimate the function over a longer period. Similarly, Disyatat and
Galati (2005) found that theCNB tended to intervene mainly when thespeed
at which the koruna appreciated against the euro tended to accelerate.
4. Effectiveness of the CNB’s Interventions within the Structural
Approach
Due to possible endogeneity bias, we apply the instrumental variables ap-
proach and estimate the impact of interventions on the exchange rate level
using the two-stage least squares method.9 We estimate the following ex-
change-rate equation:
4                           n
 st = d0 +  aiINTt–i +  ciXit +  t (2)
i=0                        i=1
The change in closing exchange rate s between the day t–1 and t is ex-
pected to be dependent on the volume of interventions (purchases of foreign
currency) INT conducted by the central bank during the day t and possibly
also on previous days, and on other control variables X. If intervention is
effective, we expect a positive ai (i.e. purchases of foreign currency are as-
sociated with the depreciation of the domestic currency).
As an instrument for interventions we use the predicted values from re-
action function (1). However, low adjusted R2 in Table 1 suggests that we
are able to explain only a small part of the variance in the intervention vari-
able. This is caused mainly by the fact that the intervention variable INT
is characterized by a number of zeros, as out of the 262 business days in
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TABLE 1 Estimated Reaction Function
Coefficient Standard error Significance level
b0 –3.30 5.56 0.55
b1 –18.76 22.20 0.39
b2 –22.43 13.38 0.09
b3 81.25 36.22 0.03
b4 0.13 0.07 0.04
9 The system of simultaneous equations is made by equations (1) and (2). Related econometric
estimation problems of such a system are discussed in (Neely, 2005) and (Disyatat – Galati,
2005). Here, we follow the common practice and use lagged variables and fitted variables with-
in the two-stage least squares approach as instruments. Ideally, one should select the instru-
ments from the list of predetermined exogenous and lagged endogenous variables.the sample the CNB intervened on only 41 days. This particular feature of
interventions may cause any further inference based on the predicted va-
lues from thereaction function to be invalid (correlation between such anin-
strument and the actual variable INT is only around 25 %). Thus, follow-
ing Humpage (1999), we replace the predicted values with zeros on the days
of no intervention (via this correction the correlation increases to around
50 %).10
Table 2 shows the estimation results for the exchange rate equation (2).
As control variables we have used the three-month money market interest
rate spread between CZK and EUR, changes in the exchange rates of some
of the “peer” currencies (SKK/EUR and HUF/EUR), as investors may treat
eastern European currencies as substitutes, contributing to common move-
ments, and changes in the Dow Jones Euro Stoxx Broad Index to control
for external developments.11
Regression I aims at capturing the short-term (one-day) impact of inter-
ventions. For a possible medium-term impact, i.e. lasting more than one
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10 Of course, as the decision to conduct interventions might also be dependent on the develop-
ment of the exchange rate, we might partly bring back the simultaneity bias. However, as the si-
multaneity problem is much more serious in the intervention days, for which correction is done,
the resulting bias is probably negligible. Other methods discussed in the literature to make
the reaction function better predict the zero values are the binary choice model (Ito – Yabu,
2004), the “friction” model (Almekinders – Eijffinger, 1996), and the model of shadow interven-
tions (Kearns – Rigobon, 2005).
11 We report only those control variables that appeared to be significant. We have also tried 
other daily variables from financial markets, such as stock market indices, oil prices, other cur-
rencies and long-term interest rate spreads.
TABLE 2 Effectiveness of Intervention
Variable Regres- Regres- Regres- Regres- Regres-
sion I sion II sion III sion IV sion V
 st  st st – st–2 st – st–3 st – st–4
Intercept d0 0.01 –0.01
Intt a0 0.002** 0.003*** 0.002 0.000 –0.001
Intt–1 a1 –0.002* –0.000 0.001 0.000
Intt–2 a2 –0.003** –0.001 –0.002
Intt–3 a3 0.003** 0.002
Intt–4 a4 0.000
3M money market 
spread c1 –0.009 –0.009 –0.033*** –0.044*** –0.056***
 HUF/EUR c2 0.019** 0.020** 0.015 0.014 0.010
 SKK/EUR c3 0.377*** 0.339*** 0.362*** 0.302*** 0.281***
  Dow Jones Euro 
Stoxx Broad Index c4 –0.004** –0.005*** –0.005** –0.005*** –0.005**
adjusted R2 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.13
Notes: Estimated via instrumental variables (TSLS); sample: October 1, 2001 to October 1, 2002; 262 observations
* = significance at 10% level; ** = significance at 5% level; *** = significance at 1% level
Source of data: Bloomberg; Reuters; ECB; CNBday, we show the results for the impact of lagged interventions on the cur-
rent change in the spot exchange rate (II), and for the impact of past in-
terventions on the change of the level of the exchange rate over a period of
two (III), three (IV) and four (V) days.
Table 2 indicates that interventions had immediate impact on the spot
exchange rate in regression I, suggesting that a purchase of 100 million eu-
ros by the CNB led to depreciation of the Czech koruna by 0.2 CZK. How-
ever, as regards the medium-term impact, regressions II–V suggest that
the impact was insignificant or with wrong signs.
These results are similar to those of Ger‰l and Holub (2006) who, using
a longer period, found some short-term effect in some specifications but no
cumulative effect of subsequent interventions. However, the results differ
from Disyatat and Galati (2005) who found no statistically significant con-
temporaneous effect, but some (weakly) statistically significant cumulative
effect over one week.
5. Impact of Interventions on Exchange Rate Volatility
Two contrasting views exist on the impact of interventions on volatility
of the exchange rate. According to the traditional view, interventions are
used to calm “disorderly” markets, i.e. to decrease volatility. On the other
hand, following Hung (1997), interventions could be used to increase volati-
lity, thereby raising the two-sided risk in the market and causing market
participants to alter their expectations away from the certain appreciation
trend towards a more balanced development, correcting previous trading
strategies.
Following Almekinders and Eijffinger (1996), we apply a GARCH model
of the exchange rate, allowing both the change in the exchange rate and
the conditional volatility to be dependent on the volume of intervention.
A GARCH model specified in (3a–c) is estimated.
n
 st =  0 +  1It +   iXit +  t (3a)
i=2
 t    t–1   N(0,  2) (3b)
n
 2
t =  0 +  1 2
t–1 +  2 2
t–1 +  3It +   iXit + ut (3c)
i=4
As interventions react to volatility and changes in exchange-rate levels,
we control for simultaneity bias by (1) including only lagged values of in-
terventions (regressions I and II) and by instrumental variables, using
the fitted values from the reaction function for the days of interventions (re-
gression III).12
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12 When applying GARCH models, most authors do not control for simultaneity, but they sub-
sequently test the degree of endogeneity of interventions, for example by estimating a Probit
model of the reaction function (Guimaraes – Karacadag, 2004) or by the Granger causality test
(Égert – Komárek, 2005). If the degree of endogeneity is found to be rather small, the possibi-
lity of a simultaneity bias is downplayed.As Table 3 shows, (lagged) interventions did not have any significant im-
pact on the level of the exchange rate. Using the instrumented interven-
tions, there might have been some effect on the level, a result that is in line
with the preceding section. Results of regression III also suggest that in-
terventions may have contributed to an increased (conditional) volatility of
the exchange rate. This might indicate that the CNB indeed wanted to raise
volatility in the markets to make market participants aware of the two-
-sided risk.
These results confirm the findings by Égert and Komárek (2005). They
apply a variety of GARCH models in order to test the impact of interven-
tions conducted by the CNB on the CZK/EUR exchange-rate level and con-
ditional volatility over the period 1997–2002. Using a slightly different set
of control variables, they find a statistically significant, but wrong-signed
effect of CZK purchases on the level. For CZK sales, the intervention stra-
tegy in 2001–2002, they find a statistically significant impact on the level
only when using current interventions. For lagged interventions, only large
koruna sales seem to have worked. They also find that the CNB’s inter-
ventions tend to be associated with increased volatility of the exchange rate.
Ger‰l and Holub (2006) also find some, but a very small effect of interven-
tions on conditional volatility.
The volatility-enhancing strategy of the CNB may be further confirmed
by analyzing the impact of interventions on market expectations of volati-
lity, namely on implied volatility derived from currency option prices. In
the option pricing terminology, implied volatility is the expected volatility
of the return of the underlying asset prevailing at the time when the op-
tion matures. It measures the degree of uncertainty that the market at-
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TABLE 3 GARCH Model
Regression I Regression II Regression III
Mean equation
Intt–1  1 –0.0002
Intt (instrumented)  1 0.005***
Intercept  0
3-month money market rate 
spread  2 –0.012 –0.013 –0.017**
 HUF/EUR  –3 0.012 0.012 0.013
 SKK/EUR  –4 0.346*** 0.055*** 0.374***
 Dow Jones Euro Stoxx Broad 
Index  –5 –0.005*** –0.005*** –0.003
Variance equation
Intercept  0 0.002** 0.002** 0.007***
Arch(1)  1 0.142** 0.143** 0.113
Garch(1)  2 0.776*** 0.758*** 0.356**
Intt–1  3 0.000 0.000
Intt (instrumented)  3 0.002***
adjusted R2 0.14 0.14 0.10
Notes: Estimated via maximum likelihood; sample: October 1, 2001 to October 1, 2002; 262 observations
* = significance at 10% level; ** = significance at 5% level; *** = significance at 1% leveltaches to the future return. As the only unobserved variable in the Black
and Scholes pricing formula for options is the implied volatility, it is possi-
ble to derive it from the option price for a given strike price of the option.
For our analysis we use one-week, one-month and three-month implied
volatilities derived from prices of at-the-money call options on theCZK/EUR
exchange rate. As Bonser-Neal and Tanner (1996, p. 859) argue, at-the-
-money options are the most sensitive to changes in volatility, and thus
the most informative about the expected volatility of an exchange rate. Fi-
gure 2 shows the one-month implied volatility together with the conducted
interventions.
Figure 2 suggests that interventions may have raised implied volatility,
especially in thesecond period of interventions, as days of intervention seem
to be correlated with higher implied volatility. However, as discussed in pre-
vious sections, the link can run both ways, as interventions can be triggered
by increased (implied) volatility. Regressing changes in implied volatility
on current interventions could thus cause the estimated coefficients to be
biased.
However, in contrast to regressions on changes in the level of the spot ex-
change rate, the simultaneity problem is probably less severe here. First,
data on implied volatility were not directly observable in the market due to
their OTC character. Second, the Granger causality test suggests that there
is indeed a statistically significant link between interventions and implied
volatility, but the link runs only one way (from interventions to volatility)
at higher lags.13 To  reflect possible simultaneity at low lags, we follow
Bonser-Neal and Tanner (1996) and include also lagged implied volatility
among explanatory variables. If intervention is correlated with lagged im-
plied volatility, the intervention coefficients measure the effect of inter-
vention conditional on the level of recent volatility.14 Thus, we estimate
the equation (4) where imvol stands for implied volatility:
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13 The results of the Granger causality test are available from the author on request. imvolt = b0 + b1INTt + b2INTt–1 + b3imvolt +  t (4)
Table 4 shows the results of regression of changes in implied volatilities
of different maturities on current and lagged interventions.15
Table4 indicates that interventions, both current and lagged, led to higher
implied volatility. This result is also in line with the previous section. In
addition, the effect is not negligible: a purchase of EUR 100 million raises
1W implied volatility by 40 basis points today and 20 basis points tomor-
row. The results differ from findings by Disyatat and Galati (2005), who
have not detected any significant effect of intervention on implied volati-
lity.
The existence of implied volatilities from options of three different ma-
turities – one week, one month and three months – allows us to analyze
whether interventions have had both short-term and medium-term effects
on volatility as expected by market participants. The results in Table 4 sug-
gest that interventions have indeed raised the uncertainty about possible
developments of the exchange rate at least on a three-month horizon. How-
ever, the effect of intervention on expected volatility decreases with longer
horizons.
6. What Makes Intervention Successful? Evidence from the Event
Study
The last issue we want to explore econometrically is what makes an
intervention effective, i.e. successful. To answer this question, we apply
the event-study approach: we first define an intervention event, and then
we specify a criterion under which an intervention event can be viewed as
successful. Finally, using a logit model, we look for factors that can explain
the success of intervention.
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TABLE 4 Interventions and Implied Volatility
Dependent variable  1-week  1-month  3-month
(change in) implied implied implied
volatility volatility volatility
Intercept b0 0.292** 0.173* 0.137***
Intt b1 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.001***
Intt–1 b2 0.002* 0.002*** 0.001***
Lagged implied volatility b3 –0.040*** –0.024** –0.021*
adjusted R2 0.06 0.08 0.06
Notes: Estimated via OLS; sample: October 1, 2001 to October 1, 2002; 262 observations
* = significance at 10% level; ** = significance at 5% level; *** = significance at 1% level
14Another possibility would be to use instrumental variables: either thefitted values from there-
action function for days of interventions, or lagged interventions. However, the results do not
change substantially, as the sign and significance of intervention coefficients remain the same.
15 In principle, one could form an “umbrella’ (nested) model of the impact of interventions on
implied volatility and treat the models with different maturities as special cases.Following Humpage (1999), we define an intervention event as a single
day of intervention. Theevent is labeled as successful if theintra-day change
of the exchange rate – i.e. the change between the opening and closing le-
vels of the exchange rate – goes in the right direction. Thus, in our case
where the CNB intervened against appreciation of the Czech koruna,
the successful events are those intervention days where the exchange rate
depreciated over the day.
The event-study literature also considers other criteria of success, such
as the “smoothing” criterion (purchase of the foreign currency leads to
smaller appreciation than in a period preceding the event). However, our
choice of the event window length and the specific “direction” criterion of
success (Fatum, 2000) reflects three considerations: first, larger event win-
dows would substantially decrease the number of events, as we had in
2001–2002 only 41 days of interventions. Second, comparing the exchange-
-rate development between predefined pre-event and post-event windows
would bring additional difficulties as the interventions are clustered over
several subsequent days, so that the windows would overlap. Third, we pre-
sume that the appreciation pace of the CZK/EUR rate was so fast and
the Czech koruna was in the intervention periods of 2001 and 2002 so strong
that the real aim of interventions was to depreciate the domestic currency,
not to smooth its appreciation path. Moreover, with successful intervention
the monetary authority sends, in terms of reversing the trend, probably
a much clearer signal towards markets than when it succeeds in only
smoothing.
Table 5 gives an overview of the successfulness of interventions in
2001–2002 and in both intervention periods separately.
Table 5 shows that in the first period of intervention activity only 8 out
of 13 events were successful, just slightly over 60 %. For the second period
of “undisclosed” interventions, the results were even worse: just 11 out of
28 interventions, i.e. slightly less than 40 %, were successful in depreciat-
ing the currency. Overall, the share of successful interventions amounts to
46 %, so less than half of interventions were successful.
Due to the martingale nature of the exchange rate, i.e. high frequency of
changes of both directions, it is possible that some of the interventions may
appear successful in terms of our criterion, but the success was not due to
interventions. Thus, we also show in Table 5 the share of days that could
be labeled “successful” in a control sample (in days of no intervention in
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1st intervention period 
(October 2001–April 2002) 13 8 61.5 45.6
2nd intervention period 
(July 2002–September 2003) 28 11 39.3 45.6
Intervention period total 41 19 46.3 45.62001 and 2002). Comparison of the successfulness of interventions with
the control sample indicates that the effect of intervention on reversing
the trend is probably not statistically significant over the whole period, a re-
sult that is in line with Humpage (1999), but in contrast to Fatum (2000).
Nevertheless, in the first intervention period the impact was much clearer.
Finally, we would like to know whether a specific intervention strategy
makes intervention successful in terms of the direction criterion. We apply
a logit model such as in (5), where yi is the dummy variable that takes
the value of 1 if the intervention event is successful and 0 otherwise, and
xi stands for a vector of explanatory variables that may influence the like-
lihood of success.
1
P(yi = 1 xi) = F( xi) = ––––––––––––– (5)
1 + exp (– xi)
Among explanatory variables we include theamount of intervention, num-
ber of ticks (i.e. trades within a single day), the proportion of morning ticks,
a dummy for Monday and Friday, a dummy for disclosure of interventions,
a dummy for a “surprise” intervention (i.e. an intervention that does not di-
rectly follow another one), and the interest rate spread (see Table 6).
Table 6 suggests that no particular intervention strategy made interven-
tion more successful in terms of moving the exchange rate towards more
depreciated levels within one day. It does not seem to make any difference
whether the interventions were conducted on Friday or Monday (on Friday
the markets are usually quite thin), or whether the interventions follow in
arow or not. Similarly, thenumber of trades (ticks) within one day or thepro-
portion of trades conducted in the morning hours does not help to explain
the successfulness either. Results of regression II indicate that at the 10%
level of significance the amount of intervention may have contributed to
the successfulness, while conducting interventions in an undisclosed man-
ner actually made them less effective.
Égert and Komárek (2005) apply the event-study approach to the Czech
intervention data as well, but because they define an event according to
the number of days of no intervention that can pass within an event, their
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TABLE 6 Logit Model of the Successfulness of Interventions
Regression I Regression II
amount of intervention 0.017 0.008*
# ticks 0.006
# morning ticks / # ticks 0.263
3-month money market spread –0.867




Notes: Estimated via maximum likelihood; 41 observations
* = significance at 10% level; ** = significance at 5% level; *** = significance at 1% levelevent window is longer than one single day. For defining a successful event,
they compare the development of the exchange rate in the pre-event win-
dow and post-even window, and find that almost all intervention events
were successful in either reversing the trend or smoothing the appreciation,
regardless of how long the pre-event and post-event windows are consi-
dered to be. Nevertheless, they do not explore what has contributed to such
successfulness of the interventions.
7. Conclusions 
In this paper, the effectiveness of interventions conducted by the Czech
National Bank in 2001 and 2002 was discussed. The traditional approaches
that were discussed and applied here included the estimation of the reac-
tion function and estimation if the impact of interventions on the exchange-
-rate level, as well as on conditional and expected (implied) volatility. In ad-
dition, the event-study approach was explored and used to answer the question
of what can make interventions successful.
The results suggest that the CNB systematically intervened to limit or
stop too-rapid appreciation and that interventions were also triggered by
increased volatility. With regard to the effectiveness of intervention, the re-
sults indicate that the interventions conducted by the Czech National Bank
in 2001 and 2002 against the strengthening koruna had some small short-
-term impact on the exchange-rate level, but almost no medium-term or
even long-term impact. On the other hand, the analysis showed that inter-
ventions have contributed to increased volatility, both conditional and im-
plied, and this holds true for longer horizons as well. Thus, the interven-
tions might have been effective in the medium term through raising
the two-sided risk in the market and thus inducing market participants to
alter their expectations away from the certain appreciation trend towards
a more balanced path of the exchange rate.
The event study revealed that over the whole period of interventions, just
around 45 % of intervention days were crowned with success in terms of de-
preciating the currency within one day. However, this share of successful
interventions does not significantly differ from the share of days with de-
preciation of the koruna from the no-intervention control sample, indicat-
ing that the interventions probably had no significant impact. Neverthe-
less, the results are sensitive to the definition of success and to the event
size. The analysis of factors that may have contributed to successful inter-
vention showed that no particular intervention strategy increased the like-
lihood of success.
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Testing the Effectiveness of the Czech National
Bank’s Foreign-Exchange Interventions
Adam GERŠL – Czech National Bank, and Institute of Economic Studies, Charles University, Prague
(adam.gersl@cnb.cz)
This article reviews several approaches to testing the effectiveness of foreign-ex-
change interventions and applies some of these to data on interventions made by
the Czech National Bank in 2001 and 2002. The reaction function of the CNB and
the impact of interventions on exchange rates and on conditional and implied vola-
tility are estimated, and the successfulness of interventions is discussed within
the event-study approach. The results indicate that the interventions by the cent-
ral bank had only a minor, short-term effect on exchange rates and, to a certain ex-
tent, contributed to increased conditional and implied volatility.
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